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Skepticism confronts us with a paradox (sometimes known as “the skeptical trilemma”), a 
version of which follows: (1) I know that I am working on a computer right now; (2) I know 
that knowing that I am working on a computer right now logically implies that I am not be-
ing deceived or manipulated in the way that skeptical hypotheses imagine. (This implication 
is called “closure under known logical implication”); (3) I do not or cannot know that I am 
not being deceived or manipulated in the way skeptical hypotheses imagine. The paradox of 
skepticism is that these three statements are logically incompatible. A relatively new move-
ment in epistemology called contextualism proposes that we can accept all three of the claims 
in the trilemma, by recognizing that they are not all true within the same epistemic context. 
Briefly, contextualists claim that we can know in ordinary contexts, but cannot know that we 
are not being deceived or manipulated in a skeptical scenario, but the latter fact is true in a 
different epistemic context than the ordinary knowledge that we might have. Closure under 
known logical implication will remain true, but only insofar as the implications involved are 
alternatives that belong to the same epistemic context as the original knowledge claim. In this 
paper, I claim that contextualism’s account of how epistemological contexts change, together 
with its acceptance of closure, is implausible.
Keywords: epistemology, knowledge, closure, contextualism, fallibilism, logical implication, 
skepticism.
The paradox of skepticism
It has now become something of a commonplace to note that global versions of skep-
ticism work by generating scenarios (skeptical hypotheses) that seem to show that we can-
not know what we take ourselves to know. For example, a skeptic might remind us of the 
evil demon hypothesized in Descartes’ first Meditation, and argue that we cannot know 
if we are either deceived by such a demon (in which case what we believed would fail the 
truth condition for knowledge), or even manipulated by such a demon (which would de-
feat our justification for our belief). But the skeptic goes on to argue that we cannot know 
even if neither of these hypotheses are false, so long as we are not in a position to know 
that they are false. The skeptic manages this aspect of their view by appealing to what has 
come to be known as the closure principle1.
(Closure) If S knows q and S knows that q entails not-h, then S knows not-h.
The assumption of closure is vital to the skeptical argument, because the way skeptical 
arguments work is to fill in an example of an entailment, from some candidate for knowl-
1 The following formulation comes directly from [1, p. 93–94].
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edge, which apparently can’t be known. So, let “q” be the proposition that S has a hand in 
front of his face, and let “h” be the skeptical hypothesis that S is deceived or manipulated 
by Descartes’ evil demon. According to closure under known logical entailment, if some 
epistemic agent (S) actually knows that he has a hand in front of his face, and knows that 
having such knowledge entails that he is not deceived or manipulated by an evil demon, 
then he can simply work to the conclusion, via modus ponens, that he knows that he is not 
deceived or manipulated by an evil demon. That is, in the following argument, one can 
work from premise (1) to the conclusion (3), using the closure principle as premise (2):
(1) S knows that q.
(2) S knows that q entails not-h.
Therefore,
(3) S knows that not-h.
Indeed, many fallibilist internalists have argued for something like this as an answer 
to skepticism2. But skeptics claim that the conclusion is plainly false: no one can really 
know that some global skeptical hypothesis is false. So, they use this same argument, ne-
gating the conclusion (3) and work a modus tollens, instead: given the negation of (3) and 
the truth of closure (2), they can validly derive the skeptical conclusion that (1) is false. It 
would appear that most if not all of what we ordinarily think we know can be a substitu-
tion instance for q in the above argument, which is why skeptical arguments seem to have 
such a powerful intuitive appeal.
The contextualist approach to the challenge of skepticism has received a great deal of 
attention in the past decade or so3. Contextualism, roughly, is the claim that the stand-
ards by which we are supposed to judge claims of knowledge vary according to different 
epistemic contexts, in which different epistemic considerations might apply. The factors 
that can create different contexts and thus different standards of evaluation of knowledge 
claims, might include, for example, how much risk is engaged if a claim of knowledge 
should turn out to be false. An example of this sort of case is given by Stewart Cohen:
Mary and John are at the L. A. airport contemplating taking a certain flight to New York. 
They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask 
a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight 
itinerary he got from the travel agent and responds, “Yes I know — it does stop in Chicago”. It 
turns out that Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to make at the 
Chicago airport. Mary says, “How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They 
could have changed the schedule at the last minute”. Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t 
really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with the airline agent [9, 
p. 58].
What has happened in this case, according to Cohen, is that in ordinary epistemic 
contexts, the fact that Smith actually checked his itinerary would be enough for us to grant 
his knowledge claim. But Mary’s concerns, together with the practical importance to Mary 
and John that they make sure to get this one right, lead them to regard Smith as not know-
2 This approach is often associated with G. E. Moore. For a contemporary version of this sort of fallibil-
ist inference, see [2, p. 133–134].
3 See, for instance, [1; 3–8].
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ing. The epistemic context, Cohen claims, has shifted, resulting in a requirement of higher 
standards for them to accept a claim as knowledge.
The appeal of contextualism is that it claims to be able to allow all of the steps of 
the earlier argument we considered, while not authorizing either the skeptic’s rejection of 
premise (1) or the easy modus ponens first described, which could allow someone to affirm 
conclusion (3) with no better evidence against some skeptical hypothesis than ordinary 
experience would supply. That is, according to contextualism, premise (1) will be true in 
epistemic contexts, whereas premise (3) will never be true in ordinary skeptical contexts. 
Hence, the closure principle must be keyed to the relevant epistemic context: some con-
siderations will be relevant to given epistemic contexts, and closure under known logical 
entailment will only operate when the alternative considered (substitution instance for h 
in the above schema) is relevant to that context. In brief, if some alternative possibility (h) 
is one that someone (S) cannot know or at least does not know is false in that context, then 
neither can the entailment of its falsehood be known by S in that context. The conclusion 
we should draw, according to contextualists, is that in any such case, the introduction of 
that alternative possibility changes the context into one with higher epistemic standards 
for knowledge. The introduction of skeptical hypotheses is thus an example of a context-
changer. Contextualists argue that recognizing this about how alternative possibilities can 
change contexts explains why we find it so plausible to think that we do actually know 
many things (in ordinary contexts, for example), but also cannot know that some skepti-
cal hypothesis is false. Closure, they claim, is maintained at every epistemic level, with 
the proviso that the only alternatives one can rule out are those that are relevant to that 
context. In a context in which consideration of some skeptical hypothesis is engaged, clo-
sure shows why the fact that we cannot know the scenario to be false also allows skeptics 
(rightly, in that context) to reject a knowledge claim we might otherwise have granted 
(that is, in a different context).
Now, non-contextualists have generally attempted two different sorts of replies to 
skeptical arguments. Some anti-skeptics (especially those inclined to positions widely 
known as “externalist” or “naturalist” accounts of knowledge) have tried to argue against 
the application of the closure principle. A simple example of this approach can serve to 
make clear roughly how it works4. Reliabilism contends that knowledge is true belief that 
is generated or sustained by reliable cognitive processes — that is, by cognitive processes 
that reliably generate or sustain true belief. If S forms the belief that he has a hand in front 
of his face (q) on the basis of ordinary perception, and ordinary perception reliably gener-
ates or sustains true belief (which it will for any epistemic agents who are not actually in 
some skeptical scenario), then we can conclude that
(1) S knows q is true.
Now it may be that S enjoys no reliable cognitive process that can assure S that he is not in 
some skeptical scenario. Hence, it will also be true that
(3)   It is not the case that S knows that not-h.
4 Indeed, the example that follows is not merely a simple one, but is, indeed, a simplistic one. I do not 
intend herein to survey all of the approaches to skepticism and closure, however, but wish instead to focus 
on the contextualist approach. I offer simplistic samples of other approaches only to motivate the contextu-
alist response to them.
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But surely it cannot both be true that q and that h—it cannot both be true that S has 
a hand in front of his face and that S is a brain in a vat. And we can well imagine that S is 
quite aware of this incompatibility, as per (2). If we deny closure, however, this incompat-
ibility does not yield skepticism. So, those who deny closure assert that S can know that 
there is a hand in front of his face, even though he does not know that he is not in some 
skeptical scenario and also S knows that he cannot know that there is a hand in front of 
his face if he is in a skeptical scenario. In essence, the position endorsed by those who deny 
that knowledge presumes closure is this: We can know q even though we do not know 
everything that we know follows from the truth of q.
Various clever and at least somewhat persuasive arguments have been given for other 
replies to skepticism, but contextualists have nonetheless resisted all such arguments. The 
contextualist approach against both sorts of replies to skepticism is essentially the same: 
The contextualist reminds us of just how intuitively compelling and troubling the skep-
tical argument is5. If one of the premises of the skeptical argument is simply false, the 
strong appeal of such arguments would be inexplicable. Against those who deny closure, 
contextualists have reminded us just how very intuitive the idea of closure is: If we really 
do know and recognize that something (not-h) is a logical entailment of some proposition 
that is a candidate for knowledge (q), how can we really claim to know the knowledge-
candidate (q) if we grant that we do not and (given our circumstances or epistemic con-
ditions) cannot know what is entailed by the knowledge candidate (not-h)? The idea of 
closure under known entailment, we should recall, is so intuitive that generations of phi-
losophers have been troubled by the challenge of skepticism. Against Moorean fallibilists, 
too, contextualists have reminded us of the fact that skeptical scenarios invariably do chal-
lenge and trouble us. Whereas no one in good mental health really worries that he or she 
might actually be deceived or manipulated by an evil demon, the very idea that we might 
be invincibly deceived is not simply incredible on its face. Indeed, even if we are not at all 
inclined to believe that we are invincibly deceived, the limitations of our cognitive systems 
seem obvious enough to anyone who thinks at all about them, and so the idea that such 
limitations might be far greater and far more significant than we suppose does not really 
seem to be something we can simply dismiss, on the ground that we are also convinced 
we know many things.
One advantage of the contextualist approach, then, is that it allows us to affirm each 
of the claims that lead to the skeptical paradox. The contextualist provides an account that 
preserves the intuitive appeal of the closure principle, the skeptic’s insistence that we do 
not and cannot know that we are not invincibly deceived, and yet does not concede the 
skeptic’s conclusion that we do not know many things. But despite the appeal of this view, 
I shall now argue, two features of the contextualist approach cannot be reconciled, and one 
of these two features is the contextualist’s acceptance of the closure principle. The other, 
which I must now explore in a little more detail, is the contextualist’s way of understanding 
epistemic contexts.
5 So, as Cohen says: “The burden of the fallibilist is to resolve these puzzles and paradoxes in a way 
that preserves the truth of our everyday knowledge attributions. But a satisfying resolution requires an ex-
planation of why the paradox arises—an explanation of why we have the intuitions that saddles us with the 
paradox. As I noted, in the case of the skeptical paradox, it is not enough to simply conjoin (3) with a second 
proposition of the inconsistent triad and then infer the denial of the third. Such a “resolution” would not tell 
us how the paradox arises in the first place” [1, p. 94].
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Contextualizing epistemic standards
As is now well known, the way in which contextualists reply to skepticism is to point 
to the way in which consideration of skeptical scenarios seems to raise the presumptive 
standards for knowledge beyond what normal human beings can meet. Again, very simply 
(or simplistically), when we do attribute knowledge to someone (S) — for example, the 
knowledge that he has a hand in front of his face (q) — we do not seem to be considering 
the possibility that we or that S might actually turn out to be brains in vats. The context 
of what might be called “ordinary” knowledge claims, let us say, is the “ordinary” context. 
We should therefore understand the claim that S knows that q as one that is made within 
a certain context of cognitive discourse6.
But contextualists argue that the consideration of skeptical scenarios puts cognizers 
into a different epistemic context, within which different standards for knowledge apply. 
When asked to consider if we might be invincibly deceived, the relevant epistemic stand-
ards seem to require certainty, yet we find that we cannot be completely certain that we are 
not invincibly deceived. Because ordinary contexts do not require us to consider skeptical 
scenarios, and because the standards for disqualifying skeptical scenarios seem to be so 
high that we are inclined to think we do not satisfy them, we can be confident, according to 
the contextualist, that the ordinary epistemic context and the epistemic context in which 
we consider skeptical scenarios are different ones. Hence, although the contextualist will 
insist that closure under known logical inference applies within each epistemic context, 
it does not hold across epistemic contexts. And this is how the contextualist replies to the 
skeptic. In this way, what appears to be the inconsistent set of propositions we wish to af-
firm, which constitute the problem of skepticism, they never actually form an inconsistent 
set of judgments — for they are only true within specific epistemic contexts, and we can 
remain consistent by denying one or more of them within each of the epistemic contexts 
that apply to them. This is a nice result for contextualists, because it allows them to claim 
that we know lots of things, while also allowing them to recognize the power of skeptical 
scenarios to move us to deny knowledge.
A counterexample to contextualism in ordinary epistemic contexts
Contextualists seem to have a plausible response to the extraordinary standards the 
skeptical scenarios appear to require of us. But closure under known entailment remains 
a problem for the theory.
On a recent trip, I brought along my laptop to get some work done. I noticed, how-
ever, that my hotel room had not been supplied with a towel, so I decided to go down to 
the lobby to let the people at the registration desk know that I needed a towel. The follow-
ing set of claims relates to the short time I was out of my room:
(Closure) If Smith knows that his laptop is in his hotel room, and Smith knows that his 
laptop’s being in his hotel room entails that the laptop has not been stolen since he 
left his hotel room, then Smith knows that no one has stolen his laptop since Smith 
left his hotel room.
6 It is the context of the subject of the attribution (S), rather than that of the attributor, that matters. 
See [10].
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(1’) Smith knows that his laptop’s being in his hotel room entails that the laptop has not 
been stolen since Smith left his hotel room.
(2’) Smith does not know that no one has stolen his laptop since Smith left his hotel 
room.
(3’) Smith knows that his laptop is in his hotel room.
The contextualist grants that any knowledge claim requires warrant, and because they 
resist externalist accounts of warrant (because such accounts reject closure under known 
entailment), contextualists seem generally to regard warrant as consisting in some appro-
priate or sufficient justification. In the case of 3’, the contextualist would grant my claim of 
knowledge, as my justification for the claim is certainly more than adequate for ordinary 
contexts—not only do I actually have substantial justification for this claim, since I had 
only just left the room minutes ago, and remembered very vividly exactly where in the 
room I left the laptop, and so on. So, it is plain that a contextualist would accept my claim 
in 3’, at least within ordinary epistemic contexts.
But there are other things that I also know this case, including the banality that my 
laptop will not now be in the room if someone has taken it from the room since I left it 
there. Unlike skeptical scenarios, which contextualists argue considerably raise the stakes 
and epistemic standards customary and applicable to ordinary epistemic contexts, it seems 
plain that the observation that sometimes laptops are stolen does not require any eleva-
tion of epistemic standards, or for that matter, any significant consideration of anything 
extraordinary. Moreover, recognition of the obvious observation that when something is 
stolen, it will not remain in the place where it was before it was stolen, hardly qualifies as 
requiring epistemological sophistication. As a result, I contend that the knowledge of the 
entailment given in (1’) must also qualify as knowledge the contextualist must regard as 
applicable within ordinary epistemic contexts.
The problem for contextualists, I take it, is now obvious, for by (1’), (2’), and (Clo-
sure), I should be able to derive the consequence that I do, indeed, know that my laptop 
has not been stolen since I left my hotel room. But it does not seem that I do—how could I 
know that, since I have not been in my hotel room for several minutes, and it does not take 
long to steal a laptop. How do I know that some thief has not gained access in my absence 
and made off with my laptop?
If I am right that the contextualist is committed to granting claims of knowledge 
such as (3’), and I am also right that even in ordinary epistemic contexts no one knows that 
possessions not right now under one’s watch have not been stolen, then the contextualist’s 
commitment to closure under known entailment generates the very problem of inconsist-
ency—within a single epistemic context, in this case, what contextualists call the ordinary 
epistemic context—that his or her reply to skepticism was supposed to avoid.
A survey of the options and conclusion
Of course, contextualists could respond to this objection by abandoning the com-
mitment to closure under known entailment. But the cost of such an abandonment, we 
should be clear, would be ruinous to the contextualists’ reply to the skeptic. Without the 
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commitment to closure, contextualists can provide no better explanation of the lure of 
skepticism than rival theories offer. In order to preserve contextualism as an approach 
to the problem of skepticism, accordingly, contextualists must either affirm what I have 
denied in (2’) and claim that I really do know that my laptop has not been stolen since I 
left my hotel room, or else they must deny what I have affirmed in (3’) and claim that I 
do not know that my laptop is in my hotel room. But both are obviously unacceptable to 
the contextualist. To abandon (3’) is to abandon the idea that ordinary language contexts 
fully support claims about the whereabouts of things on the basis of clear memories. As 
a semantic theory, however, contextualism may not take such an option. But to abandon 
(2’) is simply to abandon common sense: I cannot know that a robbery has not occurred 
in some location where I am not present.
I am inclined to think that in order to preserve their account of epistemic standards, 
contextualists are going to have to count any new consideration that might alter our judg-
ment of a given case as a change in epistemic context. But if that’s right, then the very 
notion of an “ordinary” epistemic context, or even an epistemic context that ordinary 
speakers can be presumed to share, is otiose. Indeed, the very idea of an epistemic context 
becomes uselessly unstable. We cannot simply assume that some consideration that might 
be salient and appear relevant to one person will appear equally relevant and also be sali-
ent at a given moment to another. If simply reminding one another of such considerations 
changes the standards of knowledge, it follows that no sense can be made of there being 
any clear standards of knowledge to identify as settled by a context.
The problem, at base, derives from what is central to the contextual analysis of knowl-
edge, namely, that it seeks to report or describe the standards that actually apply to S’s 
linguistic context, rather than (as analytical epistemology has more traditionally sought 
to do) to prescribe applicable standards that may or may not be ones available or salient to 
S at the time of attribution. The contextualist approach presupposes that there must actu-
ally be a coherent set of standards applicable to S’s actual linguistic context, with respect 
to epistemic terms, but cases such as those I have indicated seem to me to indicate that in 
quite ordinary situations, it is unlikely that there actually is any coherent set of standards 
provided by “ordinary” epistemic language-use. Actual studies of “ordinary” epistemic in-
tuitions indicate, on the contrary, that most people actually do not have wholly consistent 
intuitions about what standards to apply to epistemic claims7. But if this is correct, there 
appears to be no good reason to think that a given epistemic context — at least if the very 
nature of a context is to be settled by actual language-use — will include a coherent set 
of epistemic standards by which we can consistently confirm or deny claims about what 
someone in that context does or does not know.
My claim in this paper is that the contextualist response to skepticism does not ac-
tually explain and provide a way to avoid the inconsistency between ordinary claims of 
knowledge, on the one hand, and the plausibility of skeptical attacks, on the other. The 
sort of example I give in (1’) through (3’) does not strike me as rare or few in number, and 
I do not see any way for contextualists to avoid the conundrum such examples seem to 
present, which generates inconsistency within what contextualists must count as a single 
(“ordinary”) epistemic context.
7 See the survey and comment on these results in [11].
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My own view about how best to respond to the skeptic is not a contextualist one, 
though it is a fallibilist one, for I think we really can know that we are not brains in vats or 
invincibly deceived, while acknowledging that what allows me to know such things does 
not bestow infallibility on my judgments about them. Good defenses for such a position 
have been offered by others, however, and would take me considerably beyond my topic 
in this paper. My argument here against contextualism, at any rate, if successful, shows us 
how not to be a fallibilist8.
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Скептицизм сталкивает нас с парадоксом (который иногда называют «трилемма скеп-
тицизма»), в качестве примера которого рассматривается следующий: (1) я знаю, что 
сейчас я работаю за компьютером; (2) я знаю, что знание, что сейчас я работаю за ком-
пьютером, логически подразумевает, что я не обманываюсь или мной не манипулируют 
8 Contra [1].
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так, как представляет это скептическая гипотеза (это следствие называется «заключе-
ние из известного логического следствия»); (3) я не знаю или не могу знать о том, что не 
обманываюсь или что мной не манипулируют так, как представляет это скептическая 
гипотеза. Парадокс состоит в том, что эти три суждения логически несовместимы. От-
носительно новое направление в эпистемологии, которое называется контекстуализм, 
утверждает, что мы можем принять все три эти заявления в трилемме, признавая, что 
они не являются полностью истинными внутри одного и того же эпистемического кон-
текста. Контекстуалисты утверждают, что мы можем знать в повседневных контекстах, 
но  не можем знать о  том, что мы не обманываемся или что нами не манипулируют 
в соответствии со скептическим сценарием, но последний факт истинен в ином эписте-
мическом контексте, чем обычное знание, которое у нас может быть. Заключение из из-
вестных логических следствий может оставаться истинным, но только до тех пор, пока 
рассмотренные следствия являются альтернативами, которые принадлежат одному 
и тому же эпистемическому контексту, что и изначальное утверждение знания. В этой 
статье я утверждаю, что интерпретация контекстуализмом того, как изменяются эпи-
стемологические контексты, вместе с его принятием заключения, неправдоподобна.
Ключевые слова: эпистемология, знание, заключение, контекстуализм, фаллибилизм, 
логическое следствие, скептицизм.
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